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FINDING A COUNTRY TO CALL HOME:
A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING LEGISLATION TO
REDUCE STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Alec Paxton†
Abstract: Statelessness is a problem that affects 12 million people worldwide,
with severe social, economic, and political consequences. This problem is particularly
acute in Southeast Asia. Over the last sixty years, Southeast Asian states have attempted
to reduce existing stateless populations through nationalization. These attempts have
been met with varying degrees of success. The United Nations High Commission on
Refugees and other non-governmental organizations have recently started to evaluate the
outcome of these legislative attempts to reduce statelessness. These ad hoc evaluations
provide valuable lessons for those who are drafting legislation to reduce existing stateless
populations as well as legal scholars evaluating their efforts. Drawing from the
experience of Southeast Asian states, this comment gives specific recommendations for
evaluating and informing legislation designed to reduce existing stateless populations in
Southeast Asian states through nationalization. This comment suggests that legislation
should relax and tailor documentation requirements for naturalization, reduce fees and
administrative burdens to naturalization, reduce residency requirements, unconditionally
naturalize those born in the state, and waive language and knowledge requirements.
Legislation aimed at reducing statelessness should incorporate principles of
nondiscrimination and safeguards against arbitrary denials of citizenship. Additionally,
states should engage in awareness campaigns that target stateless persons after enacting
the legislation.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”)
estimates that there are 12 million stateless people worldwide. 1 This
problem is particularly acute in the Southeast Asian countries of Cambodia,
Thailand, Laos, Burma, Indonesia, and Vietnam. 2 These stateless
†
Juris Doctor expected in 2013, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like
to thank the editorial staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their guidance in developing this
comment. The author invites thoughts and criticisms on the content of this comment and is available at
apaxton@uw.edu.
1
Reliable estimates of stateless populations have only been gathered in sixty countries and have
shown an estimated 6.6 million people. However, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(“UNHCR”) has estimated that there are 12 million stateless people worldwide. See UNHCR, 2009
GLOBAL TRENDS: REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS, RETURNEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED AND STATELESS
PERSONS 1 (2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4c11f0be9.html. Some estimates place this number
as high as 15 million. See, e.g., Q&A: The World’s 15 Million Stateless People Need Help, UNHCR, May
18, 2007, available at http://www.unhcr.org/464dca3c4.html.
2
UNHCR, REGIONAL EXPERT ROUND TABLE ON GOOD PRACTICES FOR THE IDENTIFICATION,
PREVENTION AND REDUCTION OF STATELESSNESS AND THE PROTECTION OF STATELESS PERSONS IN SOUTH
EAST ASIA 2 (2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d6e09932.html [hereinafter
REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE]. See also KATHERINE SOUTHWICK & M. LYNCH, NATIONALITY RIGHTS
FOR ALL: A PROGRESS REPORT AND GLOBAL SURVEY ON STATELESSNESS 1 (2009), available at
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populations exist at the fringe of society as legal ghosts and are among the
world’s most vulnerable people. 3
Stateless people lack effective
4
nationality, and thus cannot avail themselves of the legal protections of any
state. 5 Stateless populations in Southeast Asia suffer severe economic,
political, and social hardships and are at a heightened risk for trafficking.6
Their plight is made more precarious because, until recently, the
international community knew very little about the size, location, or
circumstances facing stateless persons residing in developing countries.7 As
a result, they have received substantially less international assistance as
compared to refugees and internally displaced persons.8
While the international community overlooked stateless populations
in developing countries, Southeast Asian states enacted legislation to address
the complex issues presented by these populations.
In 2004, the
international community began to recognize the subtle but devastating
consequences of protracted stateless situations.9 Legal experts at leading
international development organizations, in collaboration with UNHCR,
have started to evaluate the effectiveness of these individual pieces of
legislation and trends have begun to emerge.
This comment examines those trends and identifies factors that have
proven to be important to the success of legislation designed to reduce
statelessness in Southeast Asian states. It evaluates the outcomes of
legislation enacted by Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, Burma, Indonesia, and
Vietnam in order to craft a framework for drafting and evaluating legislation
http://reliefweb.int/node/300917 (discussing Thailand as a country with one of the highest stateless
populations worldwide).
3
Nicole Green & Todd Pierce, Combatting Statelessness: A Government Perspective, 32 FMR 35
(2009), available at http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR32/34-35.pdf.
4
The terms “nationality” and “citizenship” will be used interchangeably in this comment to refer to
formal, legal membership of a state. The author acknowledges that there are differences between these
terms; however, these differences do not affect the analysis contained in this comment.
5
LAURA VAN WAAS, NATIONALITY MATTERS: STATELESSNESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 12
(2008); UNHCR, HELPING THE WORLD’S STATELESS PEOPLE 2 (2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/r
efworld/docid/4e55e7dd2.html [hereinafter HELPING THE WORLD’S STATELESS PEOPLE].
6
UNHCR, GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 3 (2010), available
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d6e0a792.html [hereinafter GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING
STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA]; SOUTHWICK & LYNCH, supra note 2, at 3; VITAL VOICES, STATELESS
AND VULNERABLE TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THAILAND 3 (2007), available at http://www.humantraffick
ing.org/uploads/publications/Vital_Voices_Stateless_and_Vulnerable_to_Human_Trafficking_in_Thailand
.pdf (examining the situation of stateless people in Thailand).
7
See, e.g., SOUTHWICK & LYNCH, supra note 2, at 2.
8
HELPING THE WORLD’S STATELESS PEOPLE, supra note 5, at 2 (2011).
9
See, e.g., UNHCR, CONCLUSIONS ADOPTED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES 166 para. bb (2004), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworl
d/docid/4b28bf1f2.html (representing the first time the UNHCR called for protracted statelessness to be
addressed specifically).
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to reduce statelessness. The resulting framework functions as an evaluation
tool for legal scholars as well as a set of recommendations to
parliamentarians.
Part II of this comment defines statelessness and examines its causes
and consequences. Part III advances the argument that existing international
instruments provide insufficient guidance on reducing statelessness. Part IV
argues that legislative attempts to reduce statelessness can be effective and
presents a framework for evaluating and drafting national legislation
designed to reduce statelessness, building upon lessons advanced by
practitioners and scholars. The framework recommends the specific
legislative provisions, administrative protections, and awareness-raising
activities that have proven critical to the success of legislation in Southeast
Asian states.
There are two important limitations of this framework. First, it
pertains exclusively to legislation designed to reduce statelessness through
nationalization. 10 It does not profess to address legislation designed to
protect or prevent future cases of statelessness. Second, this framework is
necessarily incomplete. Reliable data and reports on the outcomes of
legislation designed to reduce statelessness are limited and evolving. This
framework is only intended to summarize the lessons that can be teased from
this emerging area of study. Instead of providing the final word on the
subject, this comment hopes to begin the conversation and encourage
additional scholarly debate on reducing existing cases of statelessness in
Southeast Asia.
II.

COMPETING DEFINITIONS AND MULTIPLE CAUSES OF STATELESSNESS
LEAD TO SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES

Statelessness is caused by a variety of defects in national and
international law. These include conflicts of law, inadequate administrative
infrastructure, state succession, migration, laws that particularly affect
women, and discrimination. Because legislation to reduce statelessness will
need to cure these defects, this section outlines the causes of statelessness
that pose major obstacles to creating successful legislation. Keep in mind
that this section presents broad issues that face multiple countries in varied
contexts, but as this comment later suggests, has strong implications for
Southeast Asian states.
10
The terms “naturalization” and “nationalization” are used interchangeably in this comment to refer
to the process by which a state recognizes an individual as a citizen of that state.
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Definitions: De Jure and De Facto Statelessness

There are two types of statelessness: de jure and de facto.
Historically, states have had the absolute right to define who is a citizen of
their state,11 and those who fall through the cracks in this mesh of citizenship
laws are labeled de jure stateless. 12 According to Article 1 of the 1954
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (“1954 Convention”),
a person is de jure stateless if that person is “not considered as a national by
any [s]tate under the operation of its law.”13 In other words, a person is
stateless if he or she is not recognized as a citizen of any state.
De facto statelessness, in contrast to de jure statelessness, eludes such
precise definition,14 and international law has not clarified the issue. The
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (“1961 Convention”), in
its final act, makes reference to “persons who are stateless de facto,” noting
that they should be treated as stateless de jure to the extent possible. 15
However, the 1961 Convention does not define the term de facto. The final
act of the 1954 Convention likewise alludes to individuals who do not fall
within the Convention’s definition of statelessness, but are nonetheless
similarly situated, making reference to a “person [who] has renounced the
protection of the State of which he is a national.” 16 Beyond this, however,
reference to de facto stateless persons is absent from international legal
instruments.
So how do we define de facto statelessness? It has traditionally been
couched in terms of ineffective nationality.17 These individuals are citizens
of a state, or possess a legally meritorious claim to citizenship, but are
11
For instance, the International Court of Justice held in the Nottebohm Case that “. . . it is for every
sovereign [s]tate to settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition of its nationality.”
Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4, at 20 (Apr. 6, 1955). See also VAN
WAAS, supra note 5, at 93; ASBJORN EIDE, CITIZENSHIP AND THE MINORITY RIGHTS OF NONCITIZENS 5,
para. 19 (1999).
12
David Weissbrodt & Clay Collins, The Human Rights of Stateless Persons, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 245,
251 (2006).
13
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 1, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117
(entered into force June 6, 1960) [hereinafter 1954 Convention].
14
For a good discussion of the difficulties with defining de facto statelessness, see Allison Harvey,
Statelessness: The ‘de facto’ Statelessness Debate, 24 J. IANL 257 (2010).
15
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175, 279, [hereinafter
1961 Convention] (with Final Act of the U.N. Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future
Statelessness, held at Geneva from March 24 to April 18 1959, and Resolution I, II, III and IV of the
Conference).
16
Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Status of Stateless Persons, July 1951, 360
U.N.T.S. 117, 122 [hereinafter Final Act of 1951 Convention].
17
See, e.g., UNHCR, THE CONCEPT OF STATELESS PERSONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (2010),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ca1ae002.html.
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unable or, for valid reasons, unwilling to avail themselves of the protections
of that state.18 A de facto stateless person might not avail themselves of the
state’s protection because of ongoing civil disorder, fear of persecution, or
practical considerations such as cost.19 De facto stateless persons include
those who have a nationality but do not enjoy the rights of their nationality,
those who are unable to document their nationality, and those who, as a
result of state succession, habitually reside in a state other than their state of
citizenship.20
In short, a de jure stateless person lacks a legal nationality and a
de facto stateless person lacks meaningful nationality.
International
instruments define de jure statelessness explicitly, but have not precisely
defined de facto statelessness. In many respects, this distinction is merely
academic; both groups face the same social, economic, and political
consequences as a result of their statelessness.21
B.

Multiple Causes of Statelessness Pose Obstacles to National and
Regional Legislation

Statelessness occurs for a variety of diverse reasons, ranging from
state succession to insufficient administrative infrastructure. Statelessness
results from inadvertent oversight as well as deliberate state action. In order
to craft a solution that corrects the devastating effects of statelessness, it is
critical to understand how statelessness occurs. This section explores nine
major causes of statelessness.
1.

Inconsistency Between Nationality Laws Gives Rise to Statelessness

Many individuals fall through the cracks created by a patchwork of
mismatched nationality laws. A person is often rendered stateless when the
national legislation of two countries differs such that the individual is left
without a legal claim to citizenship in either country. 22 For instance,
suppose a person is born in State A, which only recognizes citizenship by
descent (jus sanguinis), but whose parents are citizens of State B, which
18

Id.; see also Jay Milbrandt, Stateless, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 75, 82 (2011).
Milbrandt, supra note 18, at 82. UNHCR also has defined a de facto stateless person as one who
is “unable to demonstrate that he/she is de jure stateless, yet he/she has no effective nationality and does
not enjoy national protection.” See UNHCR, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS: A HANDBOOK FOR
PARLIAMENTARIANS 11 (2005), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/436608b24.html
[hereinafter HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS].
20
Milbrandt, supra note 18, at 82.
21
See infra Part II.C.
22
HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 27.
19
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only recognizes citizenship by place of birth (jus soli).23 In this example, the
child would have no claim to citizenship in State A because his or her
parents are nationals of State B. The child would also not have claim to
citizenship in State B because she was born in State A. The individual is
rendered stateless because of the mismatched nationality laws of State A and
State B. The risk that conflicting laws will result in statelessness is
magnified by the fact that nationality laws are extremely complicated and
they often confront equally complicated, but inconsistent, laws of a second
state.24
More subtle conflicts between nationality laws also result in
statelessness. For instance, statelessness may also occur when a state’s
nationality law requires a citizen to renounce his or her citizenship before
acquiring, or being guaranteed to acquire, a second nationality.25 This often
occurs when nationality laws fail to take into account the potential for
statelessness when a marriage dissolves while in the nationalization process.
In Vietnam, for example, many women were rendered stateless after they
married foreigners and were required to renounce their Vietnamese
citizenship prior to obtaining citizenship in their spouse’s country.26 Many
of these marriages dissolved before they were able to secure citizenship in
their spouse’s country—leaving thousands stateless.27
2.

Administrative Obstacles Create Barriers to Citizenship

People may become stateless because they cannot navigate, access, or
afford the burdensome administrative processes to obtaining citizenship.
Excessive fees, narrow deadlines, and demanding documentation
requirements create real obstacles to citizenship.28
Additionally, poorly functioning birth registration systems have left
many without any evidence of their place of birth or parentage.29 Many lack
23

VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 50.
See William Samore, Statelessness as a Consequence of the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 45 AM.
J. INT’L L. 476, 477 (1951).
25
HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 28; GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING
STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 4.
26
Statelessness occurs most commonly following the dissolution of marriages between Vietnamese
women and men from Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, or Singapore. Kitty McKinsey, Divorce leaves
some Vietnamese women broken-hearted and stateless, Feb. 14, 2007, UNHCR, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/45d324428.html; see also GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 10.
27
McKinsey, supra note 26.
28
HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 32-33. See also infra Part IV.A.2.b, which
discusses this problem in more depth.
29
VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 12.
24
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meaningful access to birth registration systems, which make it impossible to
provide the documents needed to prove citizenship. 30 Many children are
rendered stateless even though they were born in the “right” state or to the
“right” parents.31 These obstacles to registration are sometimes the result of
targeted attacks on specific populations, and other times result from
ineffective state infrastructure.32
The interplay between birth registration systems and statelessness is
hard to understate. Every year an estimated 40 million births go
unregistered.33 A child who is not registered lacks the “official and visible
evidence of a state’s legal recognition of his or her existence as a member of
society.”34
Cambodia is a prime example of how governments, in conjunction
with local communities, can overcome these administrative burdens if they
are committed to doing so. Before 2000, less than 5% of Cambodia’s
population held birth registration certificates. 35 However, in 2000,
Cambodia committed to resolve the situation and by 2005 it had registered
91% of the population.36 Local community leaders, monks, and teachers
played a vital role in building trust and explaining the importance of
birth registration to stateless communities throughout Cambodia. 37
Nongovernmental organizations helped plan the campaign, which also
contributed to its success.38
3.

Laws That Automatically Revoke Citizenship Cause Statelessness

Some states revoke citizenship if an individual resides abroad for a
certain period of time. The amount of time varies between states from a few
months39 to many years,40 and revocation can affect both natural-born and
30

HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 31.
VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 153.
32
REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, FORCED MIGRATION POLICY BRIEFING 3: STATELESSNESS,
PROTECTION AND EQUALITY 14-15 (2009), available at http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/policybriefings/RSCPB3-Statelessness.pdf/view; REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 3.
33
UNICEF, Deficient Birth Registration in Developing Countries, 24 POPULATION & DEV. REV.
659, 662 (1998).
34
NICOLA SHARP, UNIVERSAL BIRTH REGISTRATION—A UNIVERSAL RESPONSIBILITY 11 (2005),
available at http://plan-international.org/birthregistration/files/ubr-launch-report-english.
35
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, LEGAL IDENTITY FOR INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT 79 (2007), available
at http://www.adb.org/publications/legal-identity-inclusive-development.
36
Id. at 76.
37
Id. at 56-57; GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6,
at 20.
38
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 35, at 76.
39
VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 33; HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 33.
31
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naturalized citizens.41 Often, home countries do not notify individuals that
they risk losing their citizenship when moving abroad.42 In addition to laws
that revoke citizenship based on time spent away from the state, citizenship
can be automatically revoked when an individual behaves in a way
inconsistent with their loyalty to the state, such as pledging a formal oath of
allegiance to a foreign state or voluntarily serving in the armed forces of a
foreign state.43
In Burma, for example, the Burmese military junta rendered as many
as 2 million former Burmese citizens stateless after they fled Burma for
Thailand.44 Burma’s citizenship law provides that any citizen leaving the
country permanently ceases to be a citizen45 and reports indicate that the
Burmese government deemed individuals who left without government
approval to have left the country permanently—stripping them of their
citizenship. 46 These revocations are permanent, worsening the problem.
Article 22 of Burma’s Citizenship Law prevents former citizens from
reapplying for citizenship.47
4.

State Succession or Dissolution Causes Statelessness

Historically, the dissolution of states and the transfer of territory from
one state to another have been major causes of statelessness.48 This occurs
when a state dissolves, when a colony becomes independent, or when a
successor state wholly or partially succeeds a predecessor state.49 During the
transition, individuals are sometimes overlooked or affirmatively rejected as
part of the successor state, resulting in statelessness.50

40

GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 9 (2010)
(referencing Indonesia).
41
HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 41.
42
Id. at 33.
43
VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 79.
44
Id. at 168.
45
Pyithu Hluttaw Law No. 4 of 1982 [Burma Citizenship Law] (promulgated by the Chairman of the
Council of State, published Oct. 16, 1982) para. 16 (Myan.) [hereinafter Burma Citizenship Law].
46
Nyo Nyo, Burmese Children in Thailand: Legal Aspects, 10 LEGAL ISSUES ON BURMA 51, 54
(2001).
47
Burma Citizenship Law, para. 22 (Myan.).
48
Weissbrodt & Collins, supra note 12, at 261. Much has been written on state succession as a
cause of statelessness. For further discussion on this topic, see Special Rapporteur Vaclav Mikulka, First
Report on State Succession and its Impact on the Nationality of Natural and Legal Persons, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/467 (Apr. 17, 1995).
49
HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 34; VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 123.
50
VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 123.
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Arbitrary and Discriminatory Denial of Citizenship Results in
Statelessness

Statelessness often results when a state arbitrarily and discriminatorily
denies or revokes an individual’s citizenship. This generally occurs when
citizenship is withheld or revoked based on an arbitrary consideration such
as ethnicity.51 While international law has substantially curtailed a state’s
right to deny citizenship on arbitrary grounds, states have nonetheless
continued to deny citizenship arbitrarily, resulting in statelessness.52 This
discrimination is not limited to explicit provisions of national legislation, but
also occurs at the administrative level when the required documents are
inaccessible to stateless persons or when there is no meaningful avenue for
appeal.53
Some national legislation explicitly forecloses the possibility of
becoming a citizen if the individual belongs to a certain ethnic group. 54
Statelessness may also occur when facially neutral laws are applied in a
discriminatory manner 55 or when a state unjustifiably places onerous
administrative fees or obligations on some, but not all, individuals.56
6.

State Withdrawal of Citizenship Causes Statelessness

Many states have withdrawn the citizenship of large groups of
minorities in a single act.57 This is a particularly devastating variation on the
arbitrary and discriminatory revocation of citizenship 58 that historically
occurs during times of political restructuring or periods of influential and
exclusive nationalist ideologies.59 It occurred after the First World War in
Western Europe, Turkey, and the Soviet Union, and more recently with

51

Id. at 97.
Id. at 36, 95; see also REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 2 (discussing postcolonial Burma, hill tribes in Thailand, ethnic Chinese in Brunei, and ethnic minorities in Cambodia).
53
Gay McDougall, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Report of the independent expert on
minority issues, para. 27, Feb. 28, 2008, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/23; see also OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE
INITIATIVE, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND THE RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENS 5 (2004).
54
For instance, Burma’s citizenship law identifies certain ethnic groups who are granted citizenship
automatically, and provides the Council of State the right to “decide whether any ethnic group is a national
or not.” Burma Citizenship Law, para. 4 (Myan.).
55
VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 113.
56
See, e.g., REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 2-3 (discussing post-colonial Burma,
hill tribes in Thailand, ethnic Chinese in Brunei, and ethnic minorities in Cambodia).
57
REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, supra note 32, at 10.
58
See supra Part II.B.5.
59
REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, supra note 32, at 10.
52
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ethnic Nepalese communities in Bhutan and non-Arab populations in
Mauritania.60
7.

Laws Affecting Women Result in Statelessness

Laws that adversely affect women are one of the leading causes of
statelessness worldwide.61 These laws can take a variety of forms. In some
cases, a woman may lose her citizenship upon marrying a man from a
foreign state and become stateless if she does not automatically become a
citizen of her husband’s state, or after the marriage dissolves. 62 The
dissolution of a marriage may render either partner stateless, but historically
it has disproportionately affected women. 63 In other cases, a woman is
barred from passing her nationality onto her children. 64 This creates a
problem when the child is born out of wedlock, the husband denies
parentage, the husband has no nationality, or the husband refuses to
legitimize the child.65
8.

Transnational Migration Often Results in Statelessness

Migrants comprise approximately 3% of the global population. 66
Individuals or entire populations are at risk of statelessness when they
voluntarily migrate, are expelled from their home states, or flee one state to
another. Legal, social, and linguistic barriers keep many migrants from
accessing resources that are critical to preventing their children from
becoming stateless, particularly when they are unable to access birth
registration systems.67 The children of migrants are often unable to prove
parentage and place of birth, particularly in irregular migrant populations

60

Id. at 10, 12; SOUTHWICK & LYNCH, supra note 2, at 2-3, 41.
U.S. Sec’y of State Hillary Clinton, Remarks at the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees Ministerial on the 60th Anniversary of the Refugee Convention, Dec. 7, 2011, U.N. Doc. PRN
2011/T57-18.
62
See supra Part II.B.1; see also HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 33; VAN
WAAS, supra note 5, at 64 (conflict of law), 71 (divorce).
63
Lung-chu Chen, Equal Protection of Women in Reference to Nationality and Freedom of
Movement, 69 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 18, 19 (1975).
64
REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, supra note 32, at 14; GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 10.
65
HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19, at 32.
66
U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs Population Division, International Migration Report 2009: A
Global Assessment, xviii, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/316 (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.un.org/esa/
population/publications/migration/WorldMigrationReport2009.pdf.
67
VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 164.
61
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that lack access to the formal legal mechanisms that are required to become
eligible for citizenship.68
Three categories of migrants suffer statelessness more than others.
First, migrants who lose their citizenship because they migrated to a new
state without first attaining citizenship elsewhere are at particular risk of
statelessness.69 Second, children of migrants who reside in countries that
link citizenship solely to parentage are at particular risk for statelessness
because they do not have the requisite parentage. 70 Third, children of
migrants in states with poorly functioning birth registration systems are at
particular risk because, as discussed above, it is unlikely that their new home
state will have a record of their birth and they will be unable to sufficiently
document their claim to citizenship.71
9.

Abandoned and Orphaned Children are Often Stateless

Children that are abandoned for political, social, or economic reasons
and orphans without documented parentage are often rendered stateless.72 It
is difficult to establish the identity of these children because often nothing is
known about their place of birth nor about their parents’ nationality.73 This
cause of statelessness is not insignificant; UNHCR has reported finding
thousands of stateless children in orphanages.74
C.

The Combined Consequences of Statelessness Prevent Individuals
from Exercising Their Basic Human Rights

The consequences of statelessness are incredibly severe and they
pervade every aspect of a stateless person’s life. In Thailand, for instance,
stateless individuals cannot own real property, they face detention for their
status as stateless, and they are unable to access basic social services such as
68

Id. at 165.
An individual can be rendered stateless simply by migrating to a new state if the laws of the
migrant’s state automatically revoke citizenship after a citizen has been absent from the country for a
predetermined period of time. See supra Part II.B.3. This is a particularly risky situation for irregular
immigrants because their presence is undocumented and they are unable to qualify as being “lawfully
present” for the purposes of the naturalization laws of the state—a prerequisite for naturalizing in every
state. VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 168 (discussing the situation of 2 million stateless, irregular Burmese
migrants residing in Thailand).
70
VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 168.
71
Id. at 169 (noting that this is particularly true for irregular immigrants).
72
Id. at 68-69.
73
Id. at 69.
74
CAROL BATCHELOR, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK CONCERNING STATELESSNESS AND
ACCESS FOR STATELESS PERSONS 2-3 para. 4 (2002), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/415
c3be44.html (E.U. Seminar on the Content and Scope of International Protection).
69
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education and healthcare.75 The severity of these consequences can be offset
in states that guarantee certain rights to stateless individuals.76 However, no
member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) has
procedures for designating an individual as stateless. 77 Instead, the
protection of stateless individuals is, under the best of circumstances, dealt
with on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis.78 This approach threatens stateless
individuals’ civil and political rights.
1.

Statelessness Undermines Individuals’ Social and Economic Rights

The social costs of statelessness are severe. In most Southeast Asian
countries, secondary education is not accessible without proof of
citizenship.79 Even when education is provided, the surrounding economic
and social pressures prevent stateless children from attending school. 80
These individuals are often unable to access, or unable to afford, basic health
care services.81 In many states, the right to marry is linked to citizenship.82
Stateless individuals in Southeast Asia face severe economic
insecurity. In many places, they are precluded from seeking traditional
employment83 or owning property.84 When they are successful in accessing
traditional employment, they often encounter “poor working conditions,
including difficult, dangerous, and dirty jobs; verbal abuse; violence; racism;
discriminatory attitudes; cramped living conditions; intimidating workplace
75

VITAL VOICES, supra note 6, at 11.
See, e.g., REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, supra note 32, at 17-18.
77
REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 25 (noting that no ASEAN nations have
stateless determination procedures nor do they recognize stateless persons, but only refugee status); see
also infra Part III.A (discussing protections for stateless people embodied in the 1954 Convention).
ASEAN is comprised of the following states: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Laos. ASEAN
Member States, ASEANWEB, available at http://www.aseansec.org/18619.htm.
78
REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 25.
79
GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 3. This,
however, appears to be one problem that is being addressed. Thailand recently passed legislation to
provide free secondary education. THAI MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATION FOR ALL,
§ 2.3 (2000), available at http://www.unesco.org/education/wef/countryreports/thailand/rapport_1.html.
Malaysia has also recently recognized the importance of education for stateless populations residing in the
country, and the modest cost of providing this education. GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 23.
80
In Thailand for instance, a recent UNHCR study found stateless youth are 73% less likely to enter
primary school and 98% less likely to progress to higher education. GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING
STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 7.
81
REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, supra note 32, at 6.
82
VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 12.
83
See M. LYNCH, LIVES ON HOLD: THE HUMAN COST OF STATELESSNESS 1 (2005), available at
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/in-depth-report/lives-hold-human-cost-statelessness;
ELIZABETH FERRIS, THE POLITICS OF PROTECTION: THE LIMITS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 53 (2011).
84
Id.
76
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environments; and low salaries (which are often withheld).”85 Additionally,
stateless individuals typically lack access to formal credit markets and are
unable to open bank accounts.86 The cumulative effect of these hardships
produces economic insecurity and an environment ripe for exploitation. In
Malaysia, for example, the inaccessibility of traditional employment forces
some stateless individuals to resort to criminal activities, begging, and
prostitution.87
The combined effect of these structural vulnerabilities put stateless
people at particular risk for trafficking. This connection has been especially
well documented in Thailand.88 There, stateless ethnic minority populations
lack access to formal employment opportunities outside of their villages
because noncitizens have restricted travel passes that only allow for short
stays away from their villages.89 They also cannot own land90 and do not
have access to state-subsidized health care.91 The movement of noncitizens
is greatly restricted, which worsens their economic position, forces them to
make difficult and dangerous decisions,92 and prevents them from reaching
out to the authorities for assistance once trafficked.93
2.

Statelessness Threatens Individuals’ Basic Civil and Political Rights

Stateless individuals lack a voice in a state’s political dialogue, which
further marginalizes their position. Without citizenship, a person cannot
assert his or her basic civil and political rights. 94 Stateless populations
cannot stand for election, nor can they vote.95 In Southeast Asia, stateless
individuals also face unwarranted detention and arrest by authorities because
the laws there are ill-equipped to deal with the needs of stateless
85

U.N. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Prevention of Discrimination: The Rights of Noncitizens, para. 11,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23/Add.3 (May 26, 2003) [hereinafter UNCHR] (in 2006 the UNCHR was
replaced by the U.N. Human Rights Council).
86
SOUTHWICK & LYNCH, supra note 2, at 3.
87
REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 29 n.189.
88
See generally David Feingold, UNESCO Promotes Highland Citizenship and Birth Registration to
Prevent Human Trafficking, UNESCO BANGKOK NEWSLETTER ISSUE 8, Sept. 2006, at 5, available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001556/155635e.pdf; see also VITAL VOICES, supra note 6.
89
VITAL VOICES, supra note 6, at 12.
90
Thailand,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE
(Mar.
8,
2006),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61628.htm.
91
As non-citizens, stateless individual cannot benefit from the “30-baht plan” and other public health
services available to Thai citizens. KAREN LEITER & CHRIS BREYER, NO STATUS: MIGRATION,
TRAFFICKING, AND EXPLOITATION OF WOMEN IN THAILAND 2, 45, June 2004, available at
http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/reports/no-status-women-in-thailand-2004.html.
92
VITAL VOICES, supra note 6, at 12.
93
Id. at 14.
94
VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 3.
95
Id.
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populations.96 The increased likelihood of arrest coupled with the lack of
voting rights makes it difficult for stateless populations to stage
demonstrations and protests—their only remaining political rights.97
Stateless populations also remain at risk of displacement and mass
expulsion.98 This most often occurs when nationality has been arbitrarily
stripped for a discriminatory reason, such as ethnicity. 99 The consequences
of displacement are severe. It deprives people of the essentials of life,
including food, shelter, community, education, and a resource base for selfreliance.100
III.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS PROTECT AGAINST AND PREVENT
STATELESSNESS, BUT DOMESTIC LEGISLATION ALSO HAS THE POWER
TO REDUCE INSTANCES OF STATELESSNESS

International law, most notably Article 15 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, clearly establishes an individual’s “right to a
nationality.” 101 Despite recognizing this right, subsequent international
agreements have aimed to protect existing stateless populations and prevent
future cases of statelessness instead of working to reduce current instances
of statelessness. International instruments are largely silent on the how and
when to reduce existing cases of statelessness, and they provide little
guidance in the subject. Despite the international community’s silence,
many Southeast Asian states have experimented with legislation to reduce
statelessness, some with considerable success.

96

Weissbrodt & Collins, supra note 12, at 267-68.
For an example of this occurring in South Asia, see Paula Banerjee, Women, Trafficking, and
Statelessness in South Asia, 27 REFUGEE WATCH CATALOGUE 42, 42-51, June 2006, available at
http://www.mcrg.ac.in/cata.htm.
98
REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 1; REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, supra note 32,
at 16.
99
McDougall, supra note 53, para. 24.
100
Francis M. Deng, Divided Nation: The Paradox of National Protection, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 217, 218 (2006).
101
Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 15(1), Dec. 10, 1948, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71. The
right to a nationality has also been posited for particularly at-risk groups of individuals in subsequent
international conventions. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
art. 5, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, ensuring racially and ethnically
neutral enjoyment of the right to a nationality); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 24,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (stating, “[e]very child has the right to a nationality”); The Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women art 9, Dec. 19, 1966, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1981, requiring that women have an equal right to a nationality as men).
97
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While Calling for a Reduction in Statelessness, the 1954 and 1961
Conventions Do Not Provide Adequate Direction on Reducing
Existing Cases of Statelessness

The 1954 Convention develops protective measures to safeguard the
rights of stateless persons.102 The primary purpose of the 1954 Convention
is to protect the rights of stateless persons residing within the territory of a
state and advance the proposition that no stateless person should be treated
worse than any foreigner who possesses nationality. 103 Chapter I defines
statelessness and establishes the general obligations and principles of the
Convention. 104 Chapters II through V define the juridical, employment,
welfare, and administrative measures contracting states are obliged to take to
protect stateless persons.105
The 1961 Convention provides specific guidance on preventing new
cases of statelessness by enumerating safeguards that can be incorporated
into national legislation.106 The title of the 1961 Convention (Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness) is a bit misleading. The original title of the
convention was “the Draft Convention on the Reduction of Future
Statelessness”107 and it was predicated on the idea that statelessness can only
be avoided through international cooperation and robust national legislation
that ensures no person “falls through the cracks.”108
The 1961 Convention creates four broad categories of protected
stateless persons.109 Articles 1 through 4 articulate protections for children
born in the state. Articles 5 through 7 protect those who renounce or lose
their nationality, conditioning any renunciation or withdrawal of citizenship
upon acquisition of another nationality.110 Articles 8 and 9 protect against
arbitrary and discriminatory deprivations of nationality, ensuring due
process and equal protection when conferring and withdrawing citizenship.
Finally, Article 10 addresses statelessness in the context of state succession,
requiring contracting states to ensure that any state transfer of territory
102

UNHCR, PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF STATELESS PERSONS: THE 1954 CONVENTION RELATING TO
STATUS OF STATELESS PERSONS 4 (2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4ca5941c9.html
[hereinafter PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF STATELESS PERSONS: THE 1954 CONVENTION].
103
Id.
104
1954 Convention, supra note 13, ch. I.
105
See id. ch. II-V.
106
UNHCR, PREVENTING AND REDUCING STATELESSNESS: THE 1961 CONVENTION ON THE
REDUCTION OF STATELESSNESS 1 (2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4ca5937d9.html [hereinafter
PREVENTING AND REDUCING STATELESSNESS: THE 1961 CONVENTION].
107
VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 42.
108
PREVENTING AND REDUCING STATELESSNESS: THE 1961 CONVENTION, supra note 106, at 2.
109
Id. at 4.
110
See generally 1961 Convention, supra note 15.
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includes provisions “designed to secure that no person shall become stateless
as a result of the transfer.”111
Both conventions call for the reduction of existing cases of
statelessness through nationalization, but they do so indirectly and provide
very little guidance on achieving this obligation. This is, in part, due to the
fact that no United Nations (“UN”) Treaty Monitoring Body monitors or
provides general recommendations on either convention. 112
The
Conventions themselves are also to blame. Article 23 of the 1954
Convention calls on contracting states to “facilitate the assimilation and
naturalization of stateless persons.”113 However, the extent of this obligation
is ambiguously limited by the phrase “as far as is possible.” 114 The
obligation to facilitate naturalization is further weakened by the reservations
and declarations of eleven states, disclaiming any obligation under this
provision or accepting it only “so far as the law allows.”115
The 1961 Convention obligates contracting states to nationalize
certain discrete classes of stateless persons. Article 1 obligates contracting
states to grant nationality to anyone born in its territory who would
otherwise be stateless by operation of law, or upon application to the
appropriate authority “in the manner prescribed by the national law,”116 and
subject to certain conditions.117 Article 1 also requires that a stateless person
whose father or mother were nationals of the state be granted nationality by
“the manner prescribed by the national law.”118 Finally, Article 2 calls upon
states to grant nationality to foundlings.119
Despite these obligations, the 1961 Convention does not provide
adequate protection and guidance to effectively reduce statelessness. First,
in many Southeast Asian states ineffective birth registration systems make it
111

Id. art. 10(1).
Weissbrodt & Collins, supra note 12, at 273.
113
1954 Convention, supra note 13, art. 23(1).
114
Id.
115
These states include Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Fiji, Kiribati, Lesotho, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the People’s Republic of
China. The most recent list of signatories and reservations to the 1954 Convention are available on the
United Nations website.
Chapter V: Refugees & Stateless Persons, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
available at http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=V~3&chapt
er=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en.
116
The 1961 Convention, supra note 15, art. 1, para. 1(b).
117
Id. States are permitted to condition nationalization on: 1) residency requirements of up to five
years, 2) that the applicant applies within the fixed window, not less than one year, 3) that the person has
always been stateless, and 4) that the person has not been convicted of a crime against national security or
imprisoned for a term of five or more years. Id. art. 1, para. 2 (a-d).
118
Id. art. 1, para. 4.
119
Id. art. 2.
112
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impossible to document a stateless person’s place of birth or parentage.120
Article 1 does not obligate states to nationalize individuals who cannot
prove, in the manner prescribed by national law, that they were born in the
territory of the state, or that they are children of a national, and hence within
the metes and bounds of the protections of Article 1 of the 1961 Convention.
By relying on the procedures prescribed by national law, the 1961
Convention leaves open the possibility that state parties may conform to the
Convention, but nonetheless host a large population of stateless persons.121
Second, the 1961 Convention does not obligate contracting states to
safeguard against arbitrary and discriminatory denials of citizenship, limiting
its effectiveness to reduce statelessness. While Article 9 ensures that a
contracting state “may not deprive any person or group of persons of their
nationality on racial, ethnic, religious, or political grounds,” 122 the
implementation of Article 1 is left to the “national law” of the state. 123
Nothing obligates or directs individual states to include safeguards against
discriminatory laws, policies or administrative practices that result in
statelessness, allowing states to continue to discriminate against
minorities.124
Finally, the 1961 Convention is under-inclusive. The provisions of
the 1961 Convention fail to extend protections to four groups of stateless
individuals. The provisions of Article 1 necessarily exclude stateless
individuals born to non-nationals who have missed the deadline for filing an
application for citizenship, individuals who have been convicted of certain
crimes, individuals who previously held a nationality, and individuals who
have not resided in the state for the requisite period of time.125 These groups
of stateless individuals are significant. First, populations rendered stateless
as a result of migration will not meet legal residency requirements. 126
Second, the economic insecurity faced by statelessness drives many to
commit crimes,127 which may disqualify them from relief under the 1961
Convention.
Finally, many stateless persons have previously held
citizenship, but were later rendered stateless.128
120

See supra Part II.B.2.
A recent study in Thailand, for instance, linked the lack of accessible birth registration to
statelessness. NICOLA SHARP, supra note 34, at 25.
122
The 1961 Convention, supra note 15, art. 9.
123
See, e.g., id. art. 1(1).
124
See supra Part II.B.5. For examples of legislative safeguards, see infra Part IV.A.1.a.
125
1961 Convention, supra note 15, art. 1, para. 2 (a)-(d).
126
See id.
127
See supra Part II.C.1; see also REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 29 n.189.
128
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing automatic loss of citizenship); see also supra Part II.B.4
(discussing loss of nationality following the dissolution of a state); Part II.B.5 (arbitrary revocation of
121
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In sum, the 1954 and 1961 Conventions provide a framework for
protecting stateless individuals and preventing future instances of
statelessness, but they fall short of providing guidance on a long-term
solution for the 12 million people who are currently stateless. A long-term
solution for these individuals requires that the international community
identify and enumerate the important legislative provisions and
administrative protections that have proven indispensible in reducing
existing cases of statelessness. Part IV of this comment begins to construct
such a framework for Southeast Asian states.
B.

Domestic Legislation Can Successfully Reduce Instances of
Statelessness

States can address statelessness using domestic legislation in a variety
of ways. Legislation can protect the rights of stateless persons,129 it can
authorize the return of stateless persons to their state of habitual residence,130
or it can naturalize stateless populations that habitually reside in a state.131
This comment is concerned with reducing statelessness through
naturalization, which can be accomplished in one of three ways. Legislation
can address individual cases of statelessness, it can target stateless
populations in citizenship campaigns, or it can facilitate the naturalization of
stateless persons.132
Individual cases of statelessness can be addressed through small
changes in naturalization laws coupled with individual applications for
naturalization or reinstatement of citizenship. 133 As discussed above, 134
thousands of women in Vietnam became stateless after they married
foreigners and renounced their Vietnamese citizenship before they obtained
citizenship in their spouse’s country. 135 Vietnam has recently passed

citizenship); Part II.B.6 (loss of citizenship following the dissolution of a marriage); Part II.B.7 (withdrawal
of citizenship).
129
GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 17.
130
UNHCR, UNHCR ACTION TO ADDRESS STATELESSNESS: A STRATEGY NOTE 16, para. 59 (2010),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/4b960ae99.html [hereinafter UNHCR ACTION TO ADDRESS
STATELESSNESS].
131
Id. para 61.
132
REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 19-22.
133
Id. at 19.
134
See supra Part II.B.1.
135
GOOD PRACTICES: ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 6, at 10.
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legislation to address these stateless persons136 and they can now apply to
restore their Vietnamese nationality on a case-by-case basis.137
Citizenship campaigns specifically target stateless populations. 138
Legislation that naturalizes large populations en masse is a common way for
this to occur.139 For example, after Indonesia gained its independence in
1945, many ethnic Chinese migrants lacked Chinese citizenship and were
unable to naturalize because they did not have the ability to document their
longstanding ties to Indonesia. 140 After petitioning for a solution, a
presidential decree in 2000 collectively naturalized 110,000 stateless
individuals.141
Facilitated naturalization considers individual applications for
naturalization, but the procedures and requirements for naturalization are
less stringent for stateless individuals.142 For example, Vietnam has recently
passed legislation ordering relaxed naturalization procedures and
requirements for stateless individuals permanently residing in the country.143
The law eliminated fees associated with the naturalization procedures and
reduced the requirement for personal identification papers for these
individuals.144
The problems posed by statelessness vary depending on a state’s
political and social climate, and legislation to reduce statelessness will need
to be tailored to the particularities of a situation. Accordingly, this comment
does not recommend any single solution for reducing statelessness. Rather,
the following section develops a framework that helps guide and evaluate
legislation designed to reduce statelessness within Southeast Asia, relying on
the experiences of Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Burma.
Because the literature on this topic is still evolving, this framework is
necessarily incomplete. Instead, the following sections outline the lessons
that can be drawn from the emerging body of literature in hopes of

136

Law on Vietnamese Nationality, Order No. 22 (2008), art. 23(f) [hereinafter Law on Vietnamese
Nationality].
137
REGIONAL EXPERT ROUNDTABLE, supra note 2, at 20. The Vietnamese government is developing
a study of the beneficiary population and strategies for awareness raising and legal assistance.
138
Id.
139
It can also occur by decree or administrative order. Id.
140
Id. at 21.
141
Id. at 20.
142
Id. at 21-22.
143
Law on Vietnamese Nationality, art. 8. See also Government Decree No. 78 (2009) (Viet.)
[hereinafter Government Decree No. 78] (describing and guiding the Law on Vietnamese Nationality
art. 8(1) and clarifying that “permanently residing” means “stably residing in the Vietnamese territory since
July 1, 1989”).
144
Government Decree No. 78 (Viet.).
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encouraging additional study and debate over the essential elements of
legislation designed to reduce statelessness through nationalization.
IV.

THERE IS SUFFICIENT RESEARCH TO BEGIN DEVELOPING A
FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING LEGISLATION TO REDUCE EXISTING
CASES OF STATELESSNESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

International law has developed frameworks to protect existing
stateless populations and prevent new cases of statelessness, but there is no
framework to reduce statelessness.145 A successful framework will focus on
specific provisions in national legislation. Similar to the 1961 Convention,
it will make recommendations for provisions in national legislation and
measure legislation against these recommendations. There have been
relatively few attempts to construct such a framework based on the
experiences of individual states and international experts.146
This framework is drawn from the experiences of Cambodia,
Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Burma, as well as from the broad
recommendations of international organizations.
It will make
recommendations against which national legislation designed to reduce
statelessness in Southeast Asia can be measured. The purpose of the
framework is to provide recommendations to parliamentarians, and to
provide an analytic tool for legal scholars evaluating this type of legislation.
A.

All Legislation to Reduce Statelessness Should Include Three
Important Provisions, and Legislation to Facilitate the Naturalization
of Stateless Should Include Five Additional Provisions

Nations can reduce stateless populations through naturalization by
individual application, citizenship campaigns, or facilitated naturalization.147
Regardless of the path chosen, the experiences of international organizations
and individual states have identified three provisions in national legislation
that bear heavily on the success of these pieces of legislation. The following
145
See supra Part III. The 1961 Convention is the yardstick for measuring national legislation
designed to prevent future cases of statelessness, while the 1954 Convention enumerates important
protection measures needed to assure stateless persons basic human rights.
146
For something close to a framework, see UNHCR, STATELESSNESS: AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
FOR PREVENTION, REDUCTION AND PROTECTION (2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/49a271752.html
[hereinafter STATELESSNESS: AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK]. However, the framework is simply a series of
questions. Id. at 15-17. See also HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS, supra note 19. Unlike the UNHCR
framework, which does not note the source of these suggestions, the latter framework seeks to take an
empirical approach.
147
See supra Part III.D.
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sections explore these provisions, paying particular attention to the
experiences of Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Cambodia.
1.

Three Important Recommendations Are Applicable to all Legislation
Designed to Reduce Statelessness

Three factors have proven important to the success or failure of all
types of legislation designed to reduce statelessness. One of these factors is
intrinsic to the legislation, while the other two highlight the importance of
outside activities that states engage in before, during, and after the
legislation is passed.
a.

Legislation should Safeguard Against Arbitrary Denial of Citizenship
by Including Principles of Nondiscrimination, Ensuring the Right to
Appeal, and Removing Reference to Ethnicity from Nationalization
Laws

While the apparent causes of statelessness are technical and legal,
discrimination on racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other grounds often
plays a substantial role in causing statelessness.148 Reducing statelessness
requires undoing the subtle force of discrimination. A recent report by
UNHCR reported on a thematic investigation into the effects of
discrimination on the acquisition of nationality and concluded that
nationalization laws and practices systematically deny nationality to
minorities that are disfavored by a state.149
The situation of ethnic Rohingya in Burma demonstrates the way in
which discrimination can stand in the way of efforts to reduce statelessness.
The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic group descended from the northern
Arakan region of Burma, 150 and they are forbidden from marrying or
traveling without permission. 151 They are also often singled out by police
for beatings and forced to perform labor.152
The Rohingya do not qualify for citizenship under Burma’s 1982
Citizenship Law. 153 This law provides the Council of State with the
authority to determine whether the Rohingya are among the ethnic groups
148

UNHCR ACTION TO ADDRESS STATELESSNESS, supra note 130, at 25.
McDougall, supra note 53, at 15, paras. 44-45.
150
Burma [Myanmar]: Information on Rohingya Refugees, UNHCR REFWORLD (1999),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USCIS,,MMR,,3ae6a6a41c,0.html (last visited May 1, 2012).
151
Mike Thompson, Burma’s Forgotten Rohingya, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2006).
152
Id.
153
Nurul Islam, Ronhingyas Should Not Be Treated in Hostile Way, WEEKLY BLITZ (Mar. 3, 2010),
http://www.weeklyblitz.net/576/rohingyas-should-not-be-treated-in-hostile-way (last visited May 1, 2012);
see also Burma Citizenship Law, ch. 1, arts. 3, 4.
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that may be granted nationality. 154 This decision is made in conjunction
with the Central Body, which has sweeping powers to determine citizenship
policy.155 The Council of State has not designated the Rohingya as citizens
under the law, 156 and consequently hundreds of thousands of Rohingya
remain stateless.157
This framework proposes three legislative safeguards that ensure
nondiscrimination and equal protection of stateless people when applying for
nationalization. First, legislation should ensure the right to appeal before an
independent tribunal. The right to effective appeal is a necessary component
of legislation to safeguard against discrimination. 158 Second, legislation
should enshrine principles of equal protection and nondiscrimination within
the body of the act to protect against discrimination by providing a guiding
principle for those enacting the legislation. 159 Finally, legislation should
remove references to ethnicity from the state’s nationality laws.
An example from Indonesia illustrates the importance of this final
safeguard. Prior to 2000, at least 209,000 ethnic Chinese were stateless. 160
In 2006, Indonesia passed legislation abolishing the distinction between
indigenous and non-indigenous groups in their nationalization law. 161
Abolishing this distinction allowed over 3,000 stateless ethnic Chinese who
were previously ineligible for citizenship to nationalize.162
b.

The State Should Engage in Awareness Campaigns that Target
Stateless Persons

In order for legislation to be successful, stateless populations must be
aware of the new legislation and understand the importance of obtaining
citizenship. Targeted awareness campaigns that aim to educate at-risk
154

Burma Citizenship Law, ch. 1, art. 3.
Islam, supra note 153; see also Burma Citizenship Law, ch. 1, arts. 2(i), 35.
156
Islam, supra note 153.
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Palash R. Ghosh, Burma: The Tragedy of the Rohingya People, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012),
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/277760/20120106/burma-myanmar-ronhingya-refugees-bangladesh-thaila
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populations about the importance of obtaining a nationality have proven to
help guarantee the success of legislative reform.163 These campaigns remain
important because stateless people often do not initially understand the
importance of obtaining citizenship.164
UNHCR’s experience in Southeast Asia suggests that know-yourrights campaigns encourage participation when stateless populations are
otherwise reluctant to take part in the citizenship process.165 Television and
radio broadcasts, informational posters, and leaflets have all proven to be
effective means by which to raise awareness. 166 These measures are
particularly effective when the government leverages partnerships with
community leaders and civil service organizations to spread the word and
encourage participation.167 As demonstrated in Cambodia, engaging local
community leaders, religious leaders, and teachers can play a vital role in
building trust and developing an understanding of programs in stateless
communities. 168 The campaign in Cambodia was incredibly successful,
registering over 90% of the country’s population, or 12.78 million people,
between 2002 and 2008.169
c.

Legislators and Stakeholders Should Be Made Aware of the Situation
Facing Stateless Persons before Drafting Legislation

UNHCR, through the experiences in its field offices, has found that
awareness-raising and sensitivity sessions with legislators and other
stakeholders help prepare these individuals to appropriately and adequately
address the causes and consequences of statelessness. 170 Trainings help
legislators understand and appreciate the causes of statelessness, recognize
the vulnerable situation in which these individuals find themselves, and
appreciate the costs that statelessness imposes on society as a whole.171
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Legislation to Facilitate the Naturalization of Stateless Persons
Should Contain Five Important Provisions

According to field officers at the UNHCR, small-scale nationalization
programs offer the best opportunities for facilitating a reduction in
statelessness. 172 Although the 1961 Convention prescribes some of the
provisions outlined below,173 this framework bases its recommendations on
the experiences of individual states and experts who work to craft and
evaluate legislation designed to reduce statelessness.
a.

Legislation Should Relax and Tailor Documentation Requirements for
Stateless Persons When Applying for Naturalization

Most stateless individuals will have difficulty proving their birthplace,
the amount of time they have been residing in a host state, and other
common documentation requirements found in national laws.174 As a result
of being stateless, they lack access to the formal administrative structures
that create the paper trail necessary to document such requirements. 175
Without reducing and tailoring documentation requirements for stateless
individuals, facilitated nationalization legislation will be significantly less
effective because stateless individuals, by virtue of being stateless, simply
do not have access to the requisite documents.
Thailand’s multiple attempts to facilitate the naturalization of stateless
ethnic minorities living in the north illustrate the importance of tailoring
documentation requirements. The problem began in 1956 when a large
number of Hmong, Akha, Karen, Lahu, Lisu, and Mien ethnic minorities
living in the mountainous regions of northern Thailand were excluded from
the first national census—rendering them stateless. 176 The Royal Thai
Government first attempted to address this problem by issuing temporary
residency permits and granting leniency to various ethnic minority
populations.177 However, this leniency proved to be a double-edged sword.
172
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Prior to a clarification to the nationalization law in 2000, it prevented
individuals who were given leniency by the Thai government, as well as
those given temporary residency permits and irregular immigrants, from
naturalizing.178
This law was clarified in 2000, permitting stateless children born to
ethnic minorities to nationalize if they are able to demonstrate that their
parents entered Thailand prior to October 4, 1985 and that they were born in
Thailand.179 However, stateless ethnic minorities in this region encounter
social stigma, corruption, language barriers, and difficult administrative
hurdles that prevent them from registering the birth of their children and
documenting the date they entered Thailand. 180
These stringent
documentation requirements ignore the fact that children born to parents
who entered prior to this date cannot meet this high evidentiary burden
because they lack the needed documents. 181 As a result, hundreds of
thousands of villagers were without a nationality.182 Perhaps recognizing
this deficiency, the Thai Government enacted legislation in 2008 to grant
nationality to all children born in Thailand.183
b.

Legislation Should Reduce the Fees Associated with Nationalization
and Relax Administrative Deadlines

Two large hurdles to attaining citizenship are the costs associated with
the application process and the tight administrative deadlines that pervade
most national legislation.184 Stateless individuals living in remote areas will
find it difficult to make use of facilitated naturalization legislation unless
legislators relax deadlines associated with the naturalization process. This is
because normal nationalization procedures require individuals to apply at
government offices situated in urban centers, which require stateless persons
178
Nationalization Act, No. 4 (2008), § 7 paras. 1-3 (Thai.) [hereinafter Thailand Nationalization Act]
(as clarified by Regulation 2000 of the Nationality Act (Aug. 29, 2000)). For a discussion of the 2000
clarification, see THAILAND’S SUPPLEMENTARY CLARIFICATIONS TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 1920, § 3.1 (July 19-20, 2005), available at http://www.omct.org/files/2005/07/2982/wr_thailand_07_05.pdf
(as part of Thailand’s presentation of its initial report under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights) [hereinafter THAILAND’S SUPPLEMENTARY CLARIFICATIONS].
179
Thailand Nationalization Act, § 7 para 1(2), § 7(bis) (as clarified by Regulation 2000 of the
Nationality Act (Aug. 29, 2000)).
180
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registration document and the hurdles presented by the absence of a database that is capable of confirming
eligibility for citizenship).
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183
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living in remote areas to travel long distances. 185 The process may require
several trips or expensive overnight stays, which create serious impediments
to naturalizing. Likewise, unreasonable fees associated with nationalization
applications pose an obstacle to reducing statelessness because stateless
populations often live in situations of economic insecurity that prevent them
from paying for services not vital to their survival.186
Reduced fees and relaxed administrative deadlines should also extend
to the procedures necessary to obtain documentation needed to naturalize.
The same obstacles outlined above stand in the way of obtaining birth
registration and related documents, 187 and amending these procedural
hurdles will enhance a program’s accessibility for stateless persons living in
remote areas. Awareness campaigns that emphasize the importance of
obtaining citizenship can also play an important role in reducing the
challenges posed by remote stateless populations by encouraging stateless
populations to take advantage of relaxed administrative fees and
deadlines.188
Cambodia’s massive birth registration campaign demonstrates the
consequences of overlooking these two obstacles. Despite targeting stateless
populations 189 and registering 87% of the country’s population, 190 the
registration campaign did not relax the administrative deadlines and fees
associated with the registration process. The long trips to the registration
office and fees prevented many stateless people living in remote areas from
registering. 191 This demonstrates that even well-planned and generally
successful programs that target stateless populations can fail to reach the
most vulnerable stateless populations if the registration fees and deadlines
are not carefully considered during the planning stages.
c.

Legislation Should Reduce Residency Requirements

In many cases, effective legislation to reduce statelessness requires
reducing existing residency requirements.192 This is particularly true when
185
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stateless populations fail to meet statutory requirements for residency
because they have recently migrated to the state and do not meet the
statutory requirements.193 Effective legislation will consider the possibility
that existing residency requirements, in addition to documentation
requirements, are hurdles to effectively reducing statelessness.194 Carefully
designed documentation requirements are important to effective
legislation,195 but even well-crafted documentation requirements can fail to
reduce statelessness if the targeted stateless populations have not resided in
the state for the requisite period of time.
Laos is the only country that has a long-standing reduced residency
requirement for stateless individuals in Southeast Asia.196 A stateless person
of Lao race must reside within the state for three years and meet other
statutory requirements before qualifying for citizenship.197 This is compared
with five years for a person of Lao race who has citizenship elsewhere,198
and ten years for those not of Lao race.199 This law has flaws, but it also
exemplifies the type of legislation that can help reduce statelessness in the
region.
d.

Legislation Should Naturalize Stateless Persons Born in the State

In some cases, a country will refuse to grant citizenship to a person
even though they were born in the state. 200 Legislation that confers
citizenship to individuals who were born in the state can bypass the
difficulties inherent in meeting and documenting residency requirements by
simply eliminating this burdensome documentation requirement. This
includes, for instance, ethnic Cambodians who were born in Vietnam and
whose births were documented, but who nonetheless have not received
Vietnamese citizenship.201
However, this recommendation is itself not a panacea for reducing
statelessness. Often documenting one’s place of birth can prove to be an
2.html (recommending the reduction of residency requirements when using legislative measure to reduce
statelessness).
193
VAN WAAS, supra note 5, at 369 (making the same point about residency requirements for recent
migrants in the context of the European Convention on Nationality).
194
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195
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equally insurmountable obstacle because birth registry systems are so poorly
designed and burdensome that many births go unregistered.202 Without birth
certificates, stateless individuals are not able to take advantage of legislation
that grants citizenship based on a person’s place of birth.203
Thailand provides a telling example of how onerous birth registration
systems can result in a low birth registrations rates and statelessness. In
Thailand, hospitals are legally required to issue birth certificates. 204
However, many stateless ethnic minorities living in northern Thailand do not
give birth at hospitals.205 If a child is not born in a hospital, the law requires
that the parents report the birth to the head of the village, who then must
issue a birth report and forward it to the local registrar within fifteen days.206
The local registrar is then required to issue a birth certificate and add the
name of the child to the house register.207 Numerous factors complicate this
process, including rampant discrimination and prejudice against ethnic
minorities, corruption, and fear of imprisonment on the part of the stateless
individuals. 208 As a result, 40,000 births are unregistered every year in
Thailand209 and these children are rendered stateless.210
e.

Legislation Should Waive Language and Knowledge Requirements

Language fluency requirements are another obstacle to acquiring
citizenship. Learning a new language is simply infeasible for many stateless
individuals who, by virtue of being stateless, lack access to public education,
or live in remote areas.211 In Vietnam, for instance, approximately 2,300
stateless ethnic Cambodian who have resided there since the 1970s were
202
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prevented from acquiring Vietnamese nationality, in part because the law
required that they obtain a language proficiency certificate.212 This changed
in 2008 when legislation removed, inter alia, language requirements for
naturalization, resulting in a reduction in the stateless population.213
B.

Statelessness Determination Procedures Are Important for Legislation
to Reduce Statelessness and There Is Agreement Among Academics
and Practitioners on the Content of These Procedures

Statelessness determination procedures are the processes by which an
individual is classified as stateless, and they are important whenever
legislation provides specific accommodations for stateless persons. An
individual will need to first prove that he or she is stateless before
benefitting from this legislation. 214 The form and substance of these
procedures are incredibly important because stateless individuals will often
have to prove that they are, indeed, stateless before benefiting from
legislation to reduce statelessness.
A number of components—both procedural and substantive—define
the parameters of these determining procedures.
The international
community has discussed these components at length 215 and there is a
growing consensus that adequate statelessness determination procedures will
vary depending on the circumstances. 216 This discussion is particularly
lively because the 1954 Convention requires that an individual first be
designated as stateless before they are protected under the Convention. 217
While admitting that the procedures and substance of stateless determination
procedures vary with the circumstances, international actors have identified
important components of statelessness determination procedures common to
all successful schemes.218
212
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Wide agreement among academics on the substance and form of these
procedures makes it unnecessary to address each recommendation in depth
here. Instead, common components of these schemes are reproduced below
for reference. The purpose is to summarize the key ingredients involved in
designing effective statelessness determination procedures and help readers
identify when additional research may be warranted.
The following aspects of statelessness determination procedures have
been identified as particularly important to their success:
1) There is a formal procedure for determining statelessness
status.219
2) The determination is made by a central authority with the
relevant knowledge and expertise to assess applications.220
3) There are procedural safeguards that ensure a meaningful
opportunity for review and appeal from decisions.221
4) During the review process applicants are given a temporary stay
of deportation.222
5)

Determinations are conducted on a case-by-case basis. 223

6) Safeguards are established to ensure that the determination is fair,
in keeping with international standards.224
7) Applicants are provided with access to legal advice and qualified
interpreters.225
8) Written reasons for decisions are provided to applicants upon the
completion of the determination.226
9) In situations where refugee and stateless populations overlap,
applicants are advised of their refugee rights.227
219
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10) Any administrative fees should be reasonable and not act as a
deterrent to stateless persons seeking protection.228
11) Both the applicant and the government share the burden of
proving that the applicant is not considered a national by any state
under the operation of law.229 After the applicant has demonstrated,
based on all reasonably available evidence, that he or she is
evidentially not a citizen of any state, the burden of proof shifts to the
government to prove that the applicant has a nationality.230
The standards above form a yardstick with which to measure the
statelessness determination procedures of a state. Any legislation that
accommodates or otherwise singles out stateless individuals should
incorporate many, if not all, of these components when creating procedures
for determining whether than individual is stateless. Together, these
components form a robust canon of procedural due process rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

Stateless individuals continue to face severe economic, social, and
political consequences because of their status. This is particularly the case
in Southeast Asia. The causes of statelessness are diverse, and each presents
particular problems that lend themselves to particular legislative solutions.
International law encourages states to pursue solutions to the problem
of statelessness from various angles. It pushes states to prevent future cases
of statelessness and to protect existing stateless populations. The 1954
Convention creates a framework for protecting stateless populations in their
country of habitual residence. The 1961 Convention establishes a similar
framework for legislation designed to preventing new cases of statelessness.
However, international law has yet to provide a framework that
provides durable solutions for the 12 million individuals who are currently
stateless. This comment has begun to construct that framework, focusing on
the lessons learned in Southeast Asian states. Its goal was to begin forming
a framework that is useful to legal scholars evaluating legislation in
Southeast Asia and instructive to legislators crafting legislation to reduce
existing cases of statelessness in the region.
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